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Abstract 
This paper presents a case for the claim that the infamous miners paradox is 
not a paradox.  This contention is based on some important observations 
about the nature of ignorance with respect to both disjunctions and 
conditional obligations and their modal features.  The gist of the argument is 
that given the uncertainty about the location of the miners in the story and the 
nature of obligations, the apparent obligation to block either mine shaft is 
cancelled. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper a more nuanced and accurate construal of the miners paradox is 
presented and on this basis the Miners paradox is defused.  This involves 
understanding some important points about rational obligation, disjunction 
and uncertainty.  The main contentions made here are based on the observa-
tion that crucial modal and epistemic dimensions of the story are totally 
absent in typical presentations of the paradox.  Specifically, these modal and 
epistemic dimensions are left out of the typical formalizations of the 
disjunctive knowledge involved and the conditional obligations that are at the 
heart of the alleged paradox.  When these notions are included in the formal 
translation of the story and when they are added in it turns out that there is no 
paradox in the miners’ story at all.  This manner of dissolving the miners 
paradox is to be preferred to alternative solutions⎯particularly that of 
Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010)⎯on the basis of its relative simplicity.  
Importantly, it does not require radical revisions of the logical of indicative 
conditionals and the rejection of the unrestricted validity of modus ponens, as 
Koldny and MacFarlane’s solution requires.  Let us begin then by focusing 
on some important aspects of knowledge as they pertain to disjunction. 
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2. Disjunctions and Uncertainty 
Consider the following story: 
 
Joe wakes up the day after the 2000 U.S. presidential election.  He has 
not followed the details of the race and knows only that there were 
two candidates being voted for: George W. Bush and Al Gore.  He is 
aware that only one of them could have won, he does not know which 
one won and has no evidence to favor either the claim that Bush won 
or the claim that Gore won.   Joe meets up with his buddy Tony and 
Tony asks Joe “Who won the election?”  Joe responds with “Either 
Bush or Gore.” 
 
In light of this brief story, consider the following parsing of Joe’s assertion, 
where we understand clearly that the component sentences involved are 
contingent: 
 
(BG) Either Bush won the 2000 U.S. presidential election or Gore 
won the 2000 U.S. presidential election. 
 
This ordinary language English sentence might be understood to have the 
following richer correlate: 
 
(BGA) Either Bush actually won the 2000 U.S. presidential election 
or Gore actually won the 2000 U.S. presidential election. 
 
More formally, where W stands for “Bush won the 2000 U.S. presidential 
election” and G stands for “Gore won the 2000 U.S. presidential election,” 
we can regiment BGA simply as follows, where “■” is an actuality operator 
and “∨” is standard disjunction: 
 
(BGA1) ■W ∨ ■G 
 
Additionally, and as explicitly noted in the Bush/Gore story, it is clear that 
the sort of disjunction involved does not permit it to be that case that Bush 
won and Gore won, so we need to amend things as follows based on the 
recognition that ¬◊(W & G), where “&” is standard conjunction and “¬” is 
standard negation: 
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(BGA2) (■W ∨ ■G) & ¬(■W & ■G). 
 
In ordinary discourse the use of sentences like BGA also seems to connote 
epistemic uncertainty with respect to the truth of the disjuncts involved.1  If 
this is the case, then with respect to Joe, BGA can be regimented as follows, 
where KJx is “Joe knows that x”: 
 
(BGA3) (■W ∨ ■G) & ¬(■W & ■G) & (¬KJ■W & ¬KJ■G). 
 
This is just the claim that one of either Bush or Gore actually won the 
election but Joe does not know which of Bush or Gore actually won the 
election.  Finally, there is an implicative connotation involved that it is 
possible that Bush won and that it is possible that Gore won and that the 
utterer knows this.  The disjunction concerning the actuality of Bush winning 
or the actuality of Gore winning is not supposed to be true in virtue of the 
fact that one of the disjuncts is impossible and the other actually true.  So the 
epistemically complex, modalized, use of disjunction in such contexts 
suggests the following rather complex rendering, where “◊” is the orthodox 
possibility operator of modal logic: 
 
(BGA4) (◊W & ◊G) & (KJ◊W & KJ◊G) & (■W ∨ ■G) & ¬(■W & 
■G) & (¬KJ■W & ¬KJ■G).2 
 
This appears to be a typical rending of the epistemically and modally rich use 
of “or” in cases involving contingent statements where there is uncertainty 
and this has important implications for the Miners paradox, which has 
received much attention of late in the context of both ethics and 
epistemology.3  What it suggests is that the ordinary language usage of 
disjunction involves important epistemic and modal content that is 
overlooked in the standard logical translations of disjunction. 
 
                                                          
1 This is clearly the case when the epistemic agent in question does not know the disjunction to 
be true on the basis of knowing that one of the disjuncts is true but not knowing anything about 
the truth value of the other or does not know the disjunction to be true on the basis of knowing 
one disjunct to be true and employing weakening by disjunction introduction.  The view of 
disjunction developed here is then closely related to the modal account of disjunction developed 
by Zimmerman (2000) and Geurts (2005) and inspired by Kamp (1973). 
2 Again, this view is then closely related to that defended in Zimmerman (2000) and in Geurts 
(2005). 
3 See Parfit (manuscript), Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and Dutant and Fitelson (manuscript). 
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3. The Miners Paradox 
Here is a version of the story that gives rise to the miners paradox.  It is 
essentially the same as that presented, for example, by Kolodny and 
MacFarlane (2010): 
 
Ten miners are trapped in a flooding mine; they are either all in shaft 
A or all in shaft B. Given Tony’s information, each location is equally 
likely. Tony has just enough sandbags to block one shaft.  If the 
miners are in the blocked shaft, they will all be saved.   If the miners 
are in the other shaft, then they will all be killed. If Tony does 
nothing, the water will distribute between the two shafts, killing only 
the one miner at the lowest level of the mine.4  
 
The paradox implicit in this sort of story is supposed to be derived from 
considerations raised initially by Jackson (1991) about possible cases where 
the alternative with the best outcome does not have the highest utility on the 
body of known information in the situation so described.  Let us then turn to 
the presentation of the alleged paradox. 
On the basis of this story the following claims seem to be true: 
 
(M1) Tony ought to block neither shaft. 
(M2) If the miners are in A, Tony ought to block A 
(M3) If the miners are in B, Tony ought to block B. 
(M4) Either the miners are in A or they are in B. 
 
(M2)–(M4) entail, 
 
(M5) Either Tony ought to block A or Tony ought to block B. 
 
Prima facie, the paradox and the disjunctive uncertainty involved in the 
miners story can be formally regimented as follows, where OTx is “Tony is 
rationally obligated to do x”,5 MA is “miners are in A”, MB is “miners are in 
B”, BA is “block shaft A”, BB is “Block shaft B and “→” is standard 
implication: 
 
                                                          
4 See also Parfit (manuscript), Regan (1980) and Pettersson (2014). 
5 “Rational obligation” is just meant here to indicate some rationally mandated action that 
follows from one or more rational principles. 
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(M*1) OT¬BA & OT¬BB. 
(M*2) MA → OTBA. 
(M*3) MB→ OTBB. 
(M*4) MA ∨ MB. 
(M*5) OTBA ∨ OTBB. 
(M*6) ¬◊(BA & BB). 
(M*7) ¬(■MA & ■MB). 
(M*8) ◊BA & ◊BB.6 
 
So, there appear to be conflicting obligations in this case.  Technically, this is 
not a contradiction.  Generating a contradiction from M*1–M*5 requires 
additional steps as follows: 
 
(M*9) OT¬BA → ¬OTBA. 
(M*10) OT¬BB → ¬OTBB. 
 
M*1, M*9 and M*10 imply this: 
 
(M*11) ¬OTBA & ¬OTBB. 
 
Given these additional steps the miners paradox then at least appears to be a 
bona fide paradox.   
 
4. Solution 
However, even this appearance is deceptive in light of the epistemic 
modalities and uncertainties involved in the use of “or” in the story and in the 
parsing of the conditional obligations that are crucial to the story.  This 
comports with the point made above about the ordinary language implicature 
associated with disjunction.  When we incorporate these facts into the 
regimentation of the paradox we get the following, more complex 
characterization of the miners paradox propositions: 
 
(M*1) OT¬BA & OT¬BB. 
(M*2′) (■MA & KTMA) → OTBA. 
(M*3′) (■MB & KTMB) → OTBB
                                                          
. 
6 M*6, M*7 and M*8 are not required for deriving the miners paradox, but, given the account of 
disjunctive uncertainty proposed here, they are parts of the story.  Moreover, they are crucial 
parts of the solution to the alleged paradox of the miners. 
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(M*4′) (■MA ∨ ■MB) & (¬KTMA & ¬KTMB) & (KT◊MA & KT◊MB). 
(M*5) OTBA ∨ OTBB. 
(M*6) ¬◊(BA & BB). 
(M*7) ¬(■MA & ■MB). 
(M*8) ◊BA & ◊BB
                                                          
.7 
 
Notice here that the important changes are to be found in M*2′, M*3′ and 
M*4′ and they importantly involve discrimination of what is actually the case 
and what is known to be the case in the story.  The conjunction of M*4′, M*7 
and M*8 is analogous to BGA4 and it reflects the same kind of context 
involving the use of disjunction in light of epistemic modalities and 
uncertainty we found in the Bush/Gore story.  As such, it is appropriate to 
make these changes in the same way.  As per the miners’ story then, the agent 
involved in the situation does not have information favoring either ■MA or 
■MB and so does not know MA and does not know MB, although he knows 
both MA and MB are possible and that just one must be actually true.8  Thus, 
M*4′ captures better the position of that agent with respect to the disjunction 
involved in the miners story and his/her knowledge with respect to the 
disjuncts.   
Crucially then, the next contention made here is that in M*2′ and M*3′ 
the rational obligation to block one but not both of the mine shafts is 
conditionally dependent on the agent’s knowing that MA or MB, respectively.9  
In other words they are subjective obligations.  This bit of absolutely funda-
mental information is absent in the initial presentation of the putative 
paradox.  It is, however, an entirely plausible and principled assumption.  If 
the miners are in shaft A or in shaft B respectively, but Tony does not know 
this, then Tony cannot reasonably be thought to have an obligation to block 
that shaft in question rather than the other.  To deny this principle in general 
would impose a plethora of unknown and/or unknowable obligations on 
every agent, the resultant objective obligations would be practically worthless 
in deliberations about what to do under conditions of limited information and 
it would involve violations of a plausible version of the “ought implies can” 
principle.  This latter point follows because such obligations would be 
obligations that the agent could not⎯in the sense of epistemic 
7 The putative paradox can also be presented in terms of justified belief rather than knowledge, 
but this changes nothing about the analysis of the case and about the solution proffered to it here. 
8 Moreover, he has not reasons to favor the truth of MA over MB or MB over MA. 
9 See Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Ginet (2000), Rosen (2008) and Mele (2011) for philosophical 
defenses of this claim. 
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possibility⎯meet in light of this sort of ignorance.  They would be obliga-
tions that are epistemically impossible to meet in the sense that they are 
required of the agent even though the agent is totally unaware of them.  
Simply consider the following scenario involving such a conditional 
obligation: 
 
Bill is taking a walk in the woods.  He is near a river, but his view of 
the river is totally obscured.  It is also loud.  So, he cannot see or hear 
anything in the river.  Sally, who cannot swim, has fallen in the river 
near enough to Joe so that he could physically reach her and easily 
save her.  He is an excellent swimmer. 
 
If obligations like those that are alleged to pertain to the miners in the simple 
version of the putative paradox are legitimate, then by parity of reasoning we 
would have to say that Bill is obligated to save Sally where he could easily 
save her, but where he has no knowledge that she is drowning.  But it is clear 
that his epistemic state defeats the conditionality of that obligation and it is 
not even remotely plausible to claim that he does, in fact, have such an 
obligation. He is exculpated from that obligation in virtue of his ignorance 
(which is no fault of his) and this is an utterly typical but reasonable sort of 
excuse in such cases.  Specifically, the conditional obligation is defeated by 
such ignorance and such agents rightly can claim that they had no such 
obligation when the agent is unaware of it and is not at fault in being unaware 
of it.10  The same thing then goes for the miners paradox conditional obliga-
tions.  As such, where OSR¬p is “S should bring it about that ¬p” and p is a 
factual state with negative consequences such that it is morally bad that p, the 
position defended here is that obligations with the general form (p & ¬KSp) 
→ OSR¬p are not (at least not always) obligations and that reasonable 
obligations (at least typically) have the form (p & KSp) → OSR¬p.11  But, 
notice then that given the epistemic uncertainty involved in M*4′ and this 
more accurate rendering of the obligations involved, the inference from 
M*2′, M*3′ and M*4′ to M*5 is invalid.  One cannot derive a rational, 
subjective, obligation to block A or to block B from the fact that the miners 
might be in A and might be in B when the agent does not know either 
                                                          
10 This contention also has strong empirical support as Kissinger-Knox, Aragon and Mizrahi 
(2018) demonstrates. 
11 See Spencer and Wells (forthcoming) for discussion and defense of rational obligations and 
knowledge requirements like the one suggested here. 
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possibility to be the case and does not have any reason(s) to favor the truth of 
MA over MB or of MB over MA.12  This is the very kind of ignorance that 
defeats the obligations involved.  So, there is no paradox here and given 
M*1, M*2′, M*3′ and M*4′ it is clear that, rationally, Tony ought not to 
block shaft A and ought not to block shaft B in light of his ignorance about 
the location of the miners. 
 The last matter that needs to be addressed here concerns Kolodny and 
MacFarlane’s (2010, 118–119) rather convoluted contention that we cannot 
properly interpret the conditional obligations involved in the miners paradox 
as subjective obligations in the manner suggested here.  They do so on the 
basis of the claim that subjectivist interpretations of conditional obligations 
“…cannot make good sense of the use of “ought in advice” (Kolodny and 
MacFarlane 2010, 119).”  That is to say that if such obligations were 
subjective in the sense suggested here, we would not be able to make sense of 
advice about situations where advice is given by agents in superior 
information states to agents in inferior information states with respect to the 
very same situation.  Consider their Dialogue 1, where the agent in the miners 
paradox has an exchange with an adviser who, ex hypothesi, knows the 
location of the miners: 
 
AGENT: I ought to leave both shafts open, guaranteeing that nine 
survive. 
ADVISER: No, you ought to block shaft A.  Doing so will save all ten 
of the miners (Kolodny and MacFarlane 2012, 119). 
 
Kolodny and MacFarlane contend that the subjective construal of conditional 
obligations cannot properly make sense of this sort of exchange for the 
following reasons.   
They claim, first, that the subjectivist construal of conditional obligations 
makes sense of Agent’s assertion in Dialogue 1 given his/her limited 
information.  But, second, they contend that this is not true of Adviser’s 
assertion in Dialogue 1.  With respect to this scenario, they rightly claim that 
Adviser is not making a claim about what Agent ought to do given Agent’s 
limited information, for Agent already knows that and then Agent and 
Adviser would not be in disagreement when Adviser challenges Agent’s 
assertion.  In order to make sense of this, Kolodny and MacFarlane claim that 
                                                          
12 Notice that the conditional obligations also do not follow where the undesirable state is known 
merely to be possible. 
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the advice from Adviser only makes sense if there is real disagreement 
between Agent and Adviser.  Adviser knows where the miners are located 
and so challenges Agent’s claim to be obligated not to block either shaft and, 
according to Kolodny and MacFarlane, this makes sense only if Adviser is 
really in disagreement with Agent.  After claiming that this desideratum 
cannot be met, they argue further that the subjectivist reading cannot be saved 
by claiming that Agent acquires evidence about the location of the miners 
upon hearing Adviser’s claim and so is no longer obligated to not block the 
shafts due to Agent’s ignorance of the location of the miners.  But, this latter 
argument is really a bit of a red herring, for it is easy to make sense of the 
disagreement between Agent and Adviser in terms of the subjectivist 
construal of conditional obligations.   
First, let us refer to Agent as “Tony” and Adviser as “Vivian”.  So, on the 
subjectivist reading, in Dialogue 1 Tony has the following obligations: 
OT¬BA & OT¬BB.  This is only the case, however, because of his ignorance 
of the location of the miners as we saw previously and regimented as follows: 
(■MA ∨ ■MB) & (¬KTMA & ¬KTMB) & (KT◊MA & KT◊MB).  The crucial 
subjectivist bases for the conclusion that Tony ought to block neither shaft 
are the following claims: (■MA & KTMA) → OTBA and (■MB & KTMB) → 
OTBB.  However, Vivian’s situation is entirely different.  From the per-
spective of her information state the following claims are true: OV¬BA, 
KVMA, ■MA and (■MA & KVMA) → OVBA.  Vivan’s obligation would then 
be entirely different from Tony’s if she were in a position to act to save the 
miners and knows what she knows.  But, Tony does not know the location of 
the miners and so does not have the same conditional obligation as Vivian.  
Kolodny and MacFarlane appear to reject subjectivism, at least in part, on the 
basis of the following utterly implausible claim: (■MA & KVMA) → OTBA.   
More importantly, they contend on this basis that the subjectivist cannot 
explain the sense of disagreement in Dialogue 1.  But this is simply not true.  
The disagreement between Tony and Vivian is easy to understand in terms of 
subjectivism about conditional obligations, independent of any worries about 
how Vivian’s assertion effects Tony’s evidential state.   
Vivian disagrees with Tony about what Tony should do, but only in the 
sense that Tony’s obligations can be understood relative to two possible 
information states that Tony could be in and only one of which he is actually 
in.  So, Vivian is simply disagreeing with Tony in the sense that she is saying 
something like this: “No. You should block shaft A, because if you knew 
what I know that would be your correct obligation.”  But, Tony’s information 
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state is such that he does not know what Vivian knows.  If he in fact learns 
what Vivian knows, then his correct conditional obligation would change 
with the alteration in his information state and it would (at least in normal 
cases) conform to the subjective obligation that Vivian herself has given her 
information state (i.e. to block shaft A).  So, they disagree about what is the 
right thing to do only in the sense that they derive different subjective 
obligations for Tony, but they do so on the basis of the different information 
states Tony could be in.  What Vivian is saying is simply that Tony could be 
in a better state of information (one that she, in fact, occupies) and if that 
were the case, then Tony would no longer be obligated to block neither shaft.  
Of course, he is not in that state though in Dialogue 1 and since he isn’t in 
that information state he does not have the obligation to block only shaft A.  
He is exculpated from the obligation to do that because of his impoverished 
information state, and this would not be the case if he were in Vivian’s 
information state.  Vivian’s advice then is nothing more than the specification 
of an epistemic possibility that is not currently an actuality for Tony and her 
advice is nothing more than an entreaty to Tony to improve his information 
state.  So, this objection does not really undermine the subjectivist inter-
pretation of conditional obligations.  The sense of disagreement involved in 
Dialogue 1 is simple to understand and given the reasons in favor of the 
subjectivist interpretation of conditional obligations discussed earlier, the 
solution to the miners paradox presented here is to be preferred to alternatives 
that are far less conservative. 
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